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Abstract: The Memorandum of Understanding negotiated with the EU/IMF in 2010 committed the
government to reform the Joint Labour Committee (JLC) system covering low pay workers. A
significant rationale for the proposed reform was the claim that JLC regulations unduly added to
the cost of labour regarding overtime rates and particularly premiums for Sunday working. Using
the 2007 National Employment Survey this paper examines the structure of earnings of workers
likely to be covered by the JLC system and the extent to which low pay workers benefit from
overtime earnings, shift allowances and bonuses in the private sector. The evidence does not
support the argument that overtime payments including Sunday premiums in sectors covered by
JLCs represent a major cost to employers in general. Few workers actually benefit from the JLC
overtime rates. We argue that the removal of a floor on conditions of employment provided by the
JLCs may not always be in the interests of the employer but may create a race to the bottom in
low pay sectors of the economy.
I INTRODUCTION
While the economic crisis has severely affected the economic fortunes ofcountries globally, many have not responded with a significant reduction
in their minimum wage. In fact, Schulten (2010) reports that none of the 23
countries he examined cut its minimum wages in nominal terms in 2009. Five
EU countries froze their minimum wage and a majority had an increase in
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minimum wages in real terms (Schulten, 2010). Most EU countries have a
national minimum wage while some have sectoral or occupational minimum
wages such as Austria, Denmark and Germany (Funk and Lesch, 2005).
Ireland is somewhat unusual in having multiple minimum wage setting
mechanisms: a statutory National Minimum Wage (NMW), some industry
level minimum wage regulation set through voluntary collective bargaining in
the form of Joint Industrial Councils (JICs) and statutory minimum wage
regulation for vulnerable workers through Joint Labour Committees (JLCs).
JLCs are tripartite statutory bodies with employer and union representatives
and an independent chair. They propose minimum wage rates and conditions
for workers which are made legally binding for areas where collective
bargaining is poorly developed and pay relatively low such as in hotels,
catering, security, contract cleaning and retail. JLCs have been the subject of
significant public policy attention in the recession. As part of a financial aid
package Ireland received in 2010 from the European Union and the
International Monetary Fund, the government committed to reforming the
NMW and carrying out an independent review of the JLC system ostensibly to
increase flexibility and facilitate re-adjustment in the labour market.1 The
then Fianna Fáil government reduced the NMW by €1 in February 2011 but
this cut was reversed by the subsequent Fine Gael/Labour Party government
in July 2011. 
The debate on the JLC system has focused on either the elimination or
structural reform of the system. Employers favouring the termination of the
entire JLC system argue that it is “antiquated” in the modern economy and is
both irrelevant and excessive given the protection already provided for low pay
workers though the NMW and employment legislation (O’Sullivan and
Wallace, 2011). Ireland’s largest employer body, the Irish Business and
Employers Confederation (IBEC) recommended the abolition of the JLC
system in their submission to the Independent Review of Employment
Regulation Orders (EROs) and Registered Employment Agreement (REA)
Wage Setting Mechanisms as did other employer groups such as the Irish
Tourist Industry Confederation and the Irish Farmers Association.2 Calls 
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1 A second challenge to the JLC system has come from a group of fast food employers, who, in 2007,
initiated a legal challenge against the JLC which sets minimum wages for the catering sector. In
July 2011 the High Court found in favour of the employers’ argument that the power of JLCs to
set legally binding minimum pay and conditions is contrary to the Irish Constitution. This
judgment has rendered the JLC unconstitutional and leaves the whole system in a state of “limbo”
until Government action is taken. 
2 Not all employers favour abolition of the JLC system (O’Sullivan and Wallace, 2011). For
example, some employer bodies in the security industry support the retention of the security JLC
as they see it as measure to professionalise the industry (Higgins, 2011a). In addition, IBEC has
supported the JIC/REA wage setting system of voluntary industry-level collective bargaining
(Higgins, 2011b).
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for reform rather than abolition of the JLC system have come from trade
unions and from the Independent Review of the JLC system commissioned 
by the Government. Underlying much of the criticism of JLCs is the
assumption that the conditions of employment they set unduly adds to the cost
of labour particularly in domestic employments. Yet there is little available
evidence about the extent of payments such as Sunday premiums, shift
allowance and overtime payments to workers covered by JLCs. Apart from
anecdotal stories from employers and individual employees regarding the cost
and significance of such extras on top of basic earnings, there has been a
general absence of any systematic and detailed empirical data. This paper
addresses this lacuna by examining the structure of earnings of low paid
workers and the extent to which low pay workers benefit from overtime
earnings, shift allowances and bonuses. We also compare the rates of overtime,
shift allowances and bonuses for workers likely covered by JLC rates with
other higher earning workers in the private sector. The findings are based on
the 2007 National Employment Survey (NES) covering over 40,000 employees
in the private sector. 
II MINIMUM WAGES: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
A basic premise of mainstream economics is that any mandatory system
that sets a price floor such as standard wage rates, minimum wage rates and
additional costs like premiums and overtime rates above the equilibrium or
market clearing wage should cause unemployment (McConnell et al., 2008).
This assumes that the higher the costs of labour, the fewer hours an employer
will demand of an employee. As labour costs rise it becomes more expensive for
firms to hire workers and so firms hire fewer workers (or hire them for fewer
hours). In addition, as wages are set above the equilibrium price, more labour
will be willing to be provided by workers than will be demanded by employers,
creating a surplus of labour and increased unemployment (Ehrenberg and
Smith, 1994). Essentially this model predicts that raising the equilibrium
wage through setting artificial wage rates and conditions of employment helps
workers who are covered by such mechanisms and hurts people who are
seeking employment or lose their jobs because firms cut back on employment.
In more sophisticated models that allow for more complex labour markets, the
prediction of a reduction in labour demand “applies unambiguously” only to
less skilled workers whose wages are directly raised by a minimum wage
(Neumark and Wascher, 2008, p. 51). Conversely a minimum wage can be
expected to increase the employment of more skilled workers who are good
substitutes for minimum wage workers. 
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A number of studies on minimum wages produced results in line with this
economic argument though the impact is generally relatively modest (Kim and
Taylor, 1995; Neumark and Wascher, 2008). Nevertheless, this perspective
provides much of the substantive arguments for the abolition of minimum
wage mechanisms. In the UK, prior to the abolition of the Wages Councils 
in 1993, the Employment Department described them as a system that 
“… imposes a burden of bureaucracy on employers, distorts the labour market
and destroys jobs” (Clement, 1993). In a similar vein, IBEC claimed that JLCs
were putting firms in jeopardy, pushed up costs and prices and called for
greater wage flexibility to protect jobs and increase working hours (Sweeney
and O’Brien, 2011; Wall, 2011a). Indeed the details for the reform of JLCs
proposed by the Minister for Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation, Richard Bruton,
are based on the assumption that changes to the JLC system will create
employment opportunities (Wall, 2011b). 
However, the employment effects of a minimum wage are disputed both
theoretically and empirically in labour economics (Kaufman, 2009, p. 308;
Bhaskar and To, 1999). A substantial literature questions the presumed
negative employment effects of minimum wages predicted by the orthodox
economic view. It has been argued that assumptions such as equality of
market power between buyers and sellers of labour, search costs, information
costs, imperfect mobility and the “personal” element of labour markets are
unrealistic. Numerous studies show that minimum wages have had little
negative impact on employment or competitiveness and have even resulted in
positive employment effects (Bröckerman and Uusitalo, 2009; Card and
Kreuger, 1995) or have led to both positive and negative employment effects
(Fang and Gunderson, 2009). In Ireland, the introduction of a NMW in Ireland
in 2000 appears to have had little impact on employment levels or
competitiveness (O’Neill et al., 2006). In the UK, the evidence is that
minimum wages, set either through the former Wages Councils or the NMW,
had little effect on employment (LPC, 2003; Metcalf, 2008). Dickens et al.
(1999, p. 20) found “strong evidence” that the minimum wages set by British
Wage Councils compressed the distribution of earnings and no evidence of
reduced employment in the period 1975 to 1992.
Yet, despite the mainstream economic perspective many employers are
willing to pay wages above the market equilibrium rate. The incomplete and
open ended nature of the employment contract in a market society in relation
to effort levels and productivity creates significant possibilities in the labour
process (D’Art and Turner, 2006). Even after its purchase, labour power unlike
other factors of production remains a potential not a realised asset (Storey,
1980, p. 57). No employment contract can specify precisely in advance the
exact amount of effort to be expended (Edwards, 1986, p. 32). This
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indeterminate nature of the contract provides an efficiency rationale for
employers to raise wages and working conditions above the equilibrium rate
to avoid these problems and incentivise workers to go beyond contract (Fox,
1974; Edwards, 1986; Thompson, 2004,  p. 135). Moreover workers often
acquire skills and knowledge of an idiosyncratic nature that are specific to the
firm pertaining to equipment, processes and communications that act to
ensure efficient production in the firm (Williamson et al., 1975). Efficiency
wages can minimise labour turnover as workers are less likely to quit reducing
the cost of replacement including search, recruitment and training costs
(Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). Consequently it may be in the interests of
employers either individually or in the aggregate to offer wages and conditions
above the equilibrium or competitive level to their employees because it
increases their productivity and efficiency (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; Gregory
and Romer, 1991). Indeed the evidence from a large survey of Irish firms
indicated that they avoided imposing wage cuts or wage freezes in order to
maintain worker effort levels and morale and to retain the best employees
(Keeney and Lawless, 2010). Finally, employers may pay wages above the
market clearing rate due to sociological factors such as norms of fairness,
reciprocity, custom and practice, commitment and firm loyalty. Experimental
evidence supports the relationship between increased levels of reciprocity,
effort levels and effort higher wages and consequent large efficiency gains
(Fehr et al., 1997; Berg et al., 1995). 
However, this “efficiency-wage theory” may be less evident in the low-wage
sector in the absence of minimum wages as employers become “… trapped in
a ‘productive system’ that competes on low cost rather than quality”
(McLaughlin, 2009,  p. 329). In this scenario, good employers will be driven out
of the market creating a race to the bottom not just for workers but also for
consumers in terms of the quality of goods and services delivered. The concern
over the practice of undercutting was famously raised by Winston Churchill in
the early 1900s and was one of the reasons for the introduction of selective
minimum wage protection in the UK and Ireland in the form of the trades
boards – the predecessor to the JLC system. It is expected then than statutory
minimum wages can encourage employers to invest in technology and training
to increase in productivity (McLaughlin, 2009). The ability of minimum wages
to produce more efficient firms has long been an argument of minimum wage
proponents (Webb and Webb, 1909). Even if minimum wages led to some
negative employment effects, this was viewed as a necessary cost as it was in
the interests of society to have more efficient firms (Deakin and Green, 2009).
Prior to the introduction of the NMW in the UK, the Low Pay Commission
(1998, p. 15) pointed to the potential role the NMW could play in boosting
employee commitment and investment in training. However Grimshaw and
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Green (2006) note that there have been negligible results in regard to training
investment.
Another societal benefit of minimum wage mechanisms is to reduce
income inequality by compressing wage differentials at least in the lower part
of the income range (Lee, 1999). A further likely effect is to increase the
opportunity cost of not working and lessen the attraction of social welfare
benefits. Wage compression was a central policy of the Swedish economic
model from the late 1930s and generated the most egalitarian distribution of
wages and salaries in the world (Moene and Wallerstein, 2006). Wage
compression directly encouraged the movement of capital from less productive
to more productive activities and over time the gains in efficiency were
substantial (Hibbs and Locking, 2000). 
III CHALLENGES TO THE JOINT LABOUR COMMITTEE SYSTEM 
The trades boards were introduced in Ireland under the Trade Boards Act
1909 and changed to Joint Labour Committees in 1946 with wider powers to
set minimum conditions of employment and pay rates other than basic pay.
JLCs propose a set of minimum pay and conditions which are drafted into an
Employment Regulation Order (ERO) by the Labour Court, and become law
when promulgated by the Minister for Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation.
However, the terms and conditions set in EROs are legally binding on all
employments defined by them. Enforcement is through the labour
inspectorate of the National Employment Rights Authority and employers
may be prosecuted in the civil courts for breaches of an ERO. The majority of
minimum pay rates set by JLCs are within 10 per cent over and above the
NMW (O’Sullivan and Wallace, 2011). The JLC system was retained when the
NMW was introduced in 2000 and a debate on their pay rates has only arisen
in recent years. While the legal case taken by the fast food employers against
a JLC centred on the constitutionality of their powers, the trigger for the case
was the dissatisfaction amongst employers over the overtime pay rates set by
JLCs (O’Sullivan and Royle, 2009). Employers have argued that JLC overtime
rates, and the Sunday premium rates in particular, are excessive and costing
jobs. Improved enforcement of JLC pay rates in the late 2000s led to high
levels of non-compliance with JLC regulations being discovered in the catering
industry and employers were becoming increasingly liable to criminal
prosecution and payment of large sums of money for underpaid wages
(O’Sullivan and Royle, 2009). Employers’ concerns were echoed more recently
when the Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation expressed concerns
regarding the major cost differences between EROs and NMW rates (DJEI,
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2011a). The “greatest differences” arose, it argued, from additional costs such
as the power of JLCs to set minimum overtime rates including premium pay
for Sunday and unsocial hours rates (O’Sullivan and Wallace, 2011). Despite
employer arguments, the independent review of the JLC system commissioned
on foot of the IMF/EU Memorandum of Understanding concluded that the
basic framework of the current JLC system should be retained subject to a
“radical overhaul” to make it more responsive to changing economic
circumstances and labour market conditions (Duffy and Walsh, 2011, p. 2).
The culmination of the developments (the legal case, IMF/EU deal and
independent review) of the last two years has been a set of proposals on the
future of the JLC system by the Minister for the Department of Jobs,
Enterprise and Innovation, published in July 2011. The Minister has proposed
to retain the JLC system but remove its powers to set Sunday premium pay or
any other conditions covered by existing legislation and the standardisation of
benefits in the nature of pay, including overtime (DJEI, 2011b). In proposing
minimum pay rates, JLCs will now have to consider factors such as
competitiveness, average hourly rates set in comparable sectors in Ireland’s
main trading partners and employment rates – factors which JLCs previously
did not have to incorporate in decision making. Thus, while JLCs have been
retained, the Minister has responded to employer arguments regarding
Sunday premium. In the absence of objective data to date, the following
sections examine the proportion of employee earnings that are accounted for
by overtime and other additional earnings.
IV DATA AND MEASURES
The analysis in the paper is based on the National Employment Survey
(NES) carried out by the Central Statistics Office (CSO) in February 2008 with
the reference month for data being October 2007. The CSO has undertaken
more recent NES’s but the 2007 NES was the only data base that CSO
released at the time of commencing the study of JLCs and, in any case, there
appears to be no theoretical or empirical rationale to expect significantly
different results from either the 2008 or 2009 surveys. The NES covers all
sectors of the economy and replaces the Structure of Earnings Survey which
was last carried out in 1996. The purpose of the NES is to provide information
on the distribution of individual employee earnings and on the factors which
influence earnings levels. It allows results to be broken down by sector,
occupation, age, sex, educational attainment as well as many other individual
employee circumstances. Participating employers are requested to supply a
sample of employee names. The survey is composed of two parts: the employer
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is required to complete a questionnaire with basic organisational details and
practices and certain payroll-type details for the sample of employees. These
details relate to gross earnings including overtime and shift allowances in a
pay period together with hours worked in that period. An employee
questionnaire is completed separately by each of the employees in the sample
chosen. The measures used here are sourced from the combined matching in
one database of the employer and employee surveys.
The dependent variables in this study come from the employer survey
response dealing with earnings, weekly hours worked, overtime hours, shift
allowances and bonuses for the sample of employees chosen. Our critical
dependent measure is earnings per hour. While earnings per week is also
available we believe that earnings per hour is a more appropriate measure
given the extent of part-time and short time working among low pay workers.
Average hourly earnings are provided in the database by the CSO and are
derived by dividing estimates of the gross monthly earnings by estimates of
the total hours paid in the month at the level of the individual employee. In
total 9,002 enterprises were sampled and 4,395 enterprises responded – a
response rate of 49 per cent while 72,712 employees were sampled and 60,022
completed the questionnaire – a response rate of 83 per cent. Approximately
25 per cent (15,161) of respondents worked in the public sector and 75 per cent
(44,861) in the private sector. To ensure that the NES is representative of the
national labour force, a comparison is made with the National Quarterly
Household Survey (CSO, Standard Report on Methods and Quality for NES)3
and a survey weight is provided by CSO that allows the NES to be grossed up
to the employed labour force of approximately 1.7 million employees. 
Using the accepted definition of low pay work as two thirds of median
hourly earnings, workers earning €10.86 or less can be categorised as low pay
workers (median hourly earnings are €16.29). Based on this hourly rate, 19.5
per cent (335,067) of all employees can be classed as low pay workers. Since
the private sector accounts for 97 per cent of all low pay workers, the analysis
in this paper is confined to private sector workers. In the private sector 25 per
cent of workers (323,912) are in the low pay category, that is, with hourly
earnings at or below €10.86. As there are no accurate data available on the
numbers of workers covered by JLC Employment Regulation Orders, our task
is to estimate the proportion of workers in the low pay category who are likely
to be covered by JLCs. Based on a selection of hourly JLC rates in 2007,4 we
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3 see www.cso.ie/surveysandmethodologies/surveys/.../nes_quality_report.pdf
4 This range is based on the hourly rates from the following JLCs: Aerated Waters; Agri; Cleaning
exc Dub; Cleaning Dub; Handkerchief; Security; Tailoring; Women’s Clothing; Shirt making;
Provender Milling; Retail; Hotels; Catering Dublin; Catering Sept 07. We have omitted The Law
Clerks hourly rates and Hairdressing rates as the former at €13.13 is an outlier and the latter at
€6.85 is well below the NMW rate. 
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estimate a range from the mean of these rates plus two standard deviations –
this covers 95 per cent of workers likely to fall within a range of hourly
earnings from €8.23 to €9.68.5 As Table 1 indicates, 52 per cent (168,092) of
low pay workers fall within this JLC range. This figure compares relatively
closely to Duffy and Walsh’s (2011, p. 25) estimate of total employment
between 150,000 and 205,000 in the JLC sectors in 2009 and the National
Minimum Wage Commission (1998) estimate of 162,000 covered by the JLC
system. It is possible that this range underestimates the number of workers
covered by the JLC range proposed here. It may be the case that a proportion
of those earning less than €8.23 per hour but this is likely to be small as this
rate falls below the legal NMW rate of €8.65 from July in 2007. A more likely
source of error in our estimated range is workers on hourly earnings between
€9.68 and €10.86. The average JLC rate in our estimate is approximately 
4 per cent above the NMW compared to Duffy and Walsh’s (2011, p. 42)
estimate of a positive differential of about 10 per cent. However, the method
used to calculate the likely range covered by JLCs is we believe reasonably
sound with a relatively low error margin and represents a best estimate. Much
of the following analysis compares workers covered by the JLC range with all
other workers in the private sector but exclude workers with hourly earnings
less than €8.23 (32,666). 
Table 1: Hourly Low Pay Earnings and the JLC Range
Percentage Percentage N
of Low Paid of Private
in Private Sector Sector
(%) (%)
Less than €8.23 10 2.5 32,666
JLC: €8.23 to €9.68 52 13 168,092
€9.69 to €10.86 38 9.5 123,154
N 100 25 323,912
Other measures derived from the employer survey are the hours worked
and number of overtime hours per week and the value of weekly shift
allowances and bonuses. In addition, firm size and industrial sector are
sourced from the employer survey. While the employer survey does not seek
specific details on the payment of Sunday premiums to workers, such a
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employments.
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payment is necessarily returned either in the form of overtime hours or as a
shift allowance payment. Sunday premiums refer to extra payments above the
basic rate of pay and are usually calculated as overtime hours using a formula
such as time and a half or double time. Since all extra payments to employees
above the basic pay including overtime, shift allowances and bonuses are
provided by the employer for each employee surveyed, Sunday premiums are
then captured in the data provided to CSO. The variables included from the
employee survey are age; gender; educational level; occupation; part-time or
fulltime employment; nationality and union membership.
V RESULTS
As Table 2 indicates women make up 63 per cent of workers in the JLC
range despite being less than half (44 per cent) of the employed labour force
and account for 41 per cent of employees earning above the JLC range. There
is a clear relationship between levels of education and probability of being
covered by the JLC range. Employees with primary and secondary level
education are over-represented while those with a third level qualification are
under-represented. Not surprisingly perhaps, young workers under 25 years,
service/manual workers, part-time workers and non-nationals are all more
likely to be covered by JLCs. Workers under the age of 25 account for 43 per
cent of those covered by the JLC range but only 19 per cent of employees in
the labour force. Service/manual workers are more likely to be covered by
JLCs than professional/managerial workers and make up 75 per cent of all
workers covered. Part-time workers are over three times more likely to be
covered by a JLC than full-time workers, making up 43 per cent of those
covered by JLCs but only 18 per cent of the labour force. Non-nationals in
general are almost twice as likely to be in the JLC range and account for 25
per cent of workers covered.
Turning to firm level characteristics, workers in small firms (under 50) are
more likely to be in the JLC range but the difference with larger firms while
statistically significant is relatively modest. Workers’ length of service is
significant – workers with less than 5 years service are more likely to be
covered by a JLC accounting for 72 per cent of all workers in the JLC range
and 52 per cent of the employed labour force. Non-union workers, those
working in the hotels/restaurant and whole/retail sectors are also more likely
to be covered by the JLC wage range. 
Table 3 compares hours worked, overtime hours and earnings and shift
allowances between workers in the JLC range and those above these rates.
There is a statistically significant difference (using a T-Test) between the two
groups on all measures. On average workers on the JLC range work fewer
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Table 2: Characteristics of Workers with Hourly Earnings in the Private
Sector (Each Separate Measure Sums to 100 Per Cent)
Individual Distribution of Distribution of Distribution of
Characteristics Employees Covered Employees Above Employees in the 
by the JLC Range The JLC Range Labour Force 
% % %
Women 63 41 44
Men 37 59 56
Education
Primary 13 9 10
Lower Secondary 17 14 15
Upper Secondary 40 31 32
Technical/Diploma 19 24 23
Degree/Higher 11 22 20
Age
Under 25 Years 43 14 19
25 to 35 Years 24 38 35
36 to 45 Years 15 23 22
Over 46 Years 18 25 23
Occupation
Prof/Managerial 6 29 26
WC/skilled 19 30 29
Service/Manual 75 41 45
Status
Part-time 43 14 18
Full-time 57 86 82
Nationality
Non-national 25 14 15
National 75 86 85
Firm level
Under 10 22 18 19
11 to 50 37 31 32
51 to 200 19 21 20
+200 23 30 29
Service
Under 2 Years 23 11 13
2 to 5 Years 49 38 39
5 to 15 Years 21 34 32
+15 yrs 7 17 16
Union
Non-member 86 73 75
Member 14 27 25
Sector
Industry 16 37 34
Wholesale/retail 33 19 20
Hotels-restaurants 21 7 9
Finance/Administration 15 22 21
Transport/Other 15 16 15
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hours per week, fewer overtime hours and these overtime hours amount to a
smaller proportion of their hours worked per week.6 More starkly the mean
overtime earnings per week for workers covered by the JLCs is €6 compared
to €26 for those on earnings above the JLC range. A similar pattern is evident
in the payment of weekly shift allowances and bonuses. However, employee
responses to a question on shift work indicate that workers in the JLC range
are significantly more likely to report working shifts; 31 per cent compared to
24 per cent of those above the range. To test for any variations across
industrial sectors four distinct sectors were analysed. While there is some
variation it is relatively small (see Appendix). 
Table 3: Hours, Overtime and Shift Allowancesa Above and Below 
JLC Hourly Earnings
Hourly earnings Mean St.Dev. T-Test
Hours Worked Per Week JLC range 29.87 13.2 ***
Above JLC range 35.86 10.0
Number of Overtime JLC range 0.5 1.9 ***
Hours Per Week Above JLC range 1.1 2.9
Overtime Hours as Percentage JLC range 1.6% 5.9 ***
of hours worked weekly Above JLC range 2.6% 6.9
Weekly Overtime Earnings JLC range €6.20 21.3 ***
Above JLC range €25.70 73.4  
Shift Allowance Per Week JLC range €0.70 6.6 ***  
Above JLC range €10.50 45.0  
Bonus Earned Per Week JLC range €0.90 8.0 ***  
Above JLC range €21.3 212.7  
Work A Shift? JLC range 31.4% 0.5 ***  
Above JLC range 24.2% 0.4
N = 168,092 (JLC range) and 111,8692 (Above JLC range).
* P<0.05 ** P<0.01 ***P<0.001
aNote on the above measures: The employer questionnaire sought information on the
specific employees surveyed in each establishment regarding hours worked, overtime
hours, earnings for overtime, shift allowances and bonuses for a reference period
focused around the month of October 2007. Employers were allowed to choose from four
time periods: 4 weeks, a month, 5 weeks and 6 weeks. Each response was coded
accordingly for every employee case. We have coded a month as equivalent to a
reference period of 4 weeks. The final measures are reduced to a weekly basis in Table
3 by dividing the relevant measure such as number of overtime hours by the particular
reference period used by the employer. 
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Walsh (2011, p. 41) argued that it was “difficult to believe that workers covered by EROs and
REAs earn substantial premiums over similar workers in uncovered jobs” nor did they find any
indication of differences in the likelihood that ERO/REA workers will be paid more overtime
compared to similar workers in similar jobs across other sectors.
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In Table 4 we examine the pattern of hours and earnings using the more
significant individual and firm level characteristics for workers in the JLC
hourly earnings range. Within this group men on average work longer hours
with a mean of 34 compared to 28 for women. Workers in the 25 to 45 year age
group, non-nationals, full-time workers, union members and workers in
industry tend to work more hours. A total of 15 per cent of workers in the JLC
range worked more than 40 hours a week and 6 per cent worked over 47
hours.7
The mean number of overtime hours worked per week is higher among
men, younger workers, non-nationals, full-time workers, the wholesale retail
sector and particularly union members. Yet among these workers the mean
level of overtime hours worked per week is still relatively low and only in the
case of union members is it above one hour on average per week. This is
reflected in the low mean weekly earnings from overtime ranging from a high
of €14 for union members to €4 for part-time workers. Shift allowances per
week and bonuses for workers covered by the JLC range are also quite modest.
In the former case, mean weekly shift allowances range from €1.8 in the
transport industry to 20 cent in the wholesale/retain sector. Shift allowances
and mean bonuses are slightly higher on average for women, non-nationals
and full-time workers. 
Overall table 4 indicates that workers in the JLC range on average work
little overtime and that mean weekly earnings from overtime, shift allowances
and bonuses are extremely modest. However, the trends reported here are
based on mean figures for the various measures and may disguise the
importance of such payments for specific groups of workers such as non-
nationals. Even so, as Table 5 indicates, the proportion of workers covered by
the JLC range with overtime earnings, shift allowances and bonuses earned is
relatively small. Indeed up to 86 per cent of workers in the JLC range
seemingly do not work any overtime hours (as reported in the employer
survey) with only 4 per cent working over five hours per week. Only 3 per cent
of workers covered by the JLC range receive a shift allowance or a bonus
payment. A majority of those who do receive a shift allowance receive a weekly
total of €15 or less. Since over 50 per cent of workers covered by the JLC range
are employed in either the hotel/restaurant or the whole sale/retail sectors, it
may be the case that overtime hours or shift allowances are more heavily
concentrated in these sectors than finance/administration, transport and
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7 The submission of the Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation to the Independent
Review of EROs sets out examples of differences in pay received by workers covered by EROs and
those covered by the NMW based on a 48 hour week that includes rates for overtime, Sundays and
unsocial hours. Yet only a minority of workers (6 per cent) covered by JLC rates work over 47
hours.
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Table 4: Selected Characteristics of Workers Covered by JLC Rates by 
Mean Hours, Overtime and Shift Allowances 
(N=168,092: Means Reported for All Measures)
Hours No. of Overtime Shift Bonus
Worked Overtime Earnings Allowance Earned
Per Week Hours Per Week Per Week Per Week
Per Week
Women 28 0.5 €5.0 €0.8 €1.0 
Men 34 0.7 €8.4 €0.6 €0.7 
Age    
Under 25 Years 28 0.6 €6.1 €0.6 €1.0 
25 to 35 Years 34 0.7 €8.4 €0.8 €1.4 
36 to 45 Years 32 0.4 €5.4 €1.1 €0.5 
Over 46 Years 28 0.4 €4.2 €0.4 €0.3 
Nationality    
Non-national 35 0.8 €10.1 €1.2 €1.7 
National 28 0.4 €4.9 €0.5 €0.6
Status    
Part-time 20 0.4 €3.9 €0.5 €0.3 
Full-time 37 0.7 €7.9 €0.9 €1.3
Union    
Non-member 29 0.5 €4.9 €0.7 €0.9 
Member 33 1.1 €14.0 €0.8 €0.6 
Sector    
Industry 36 0.7 €9.9 €0.7 €0.7 
Wholesale/Retail 29 0.8 €9.3 €0.2 €0.5 
Hotels-restaurant 28 0.2 €2.7 €0.7 €0.1 
Finance/Administration 25 0.2 €2.6 €0.6 €0.6
Transport/Other 32 0.5 €4.1 €1.8 €3.3 
industry. The evidence indicates that workers in the hotel/restaurant sector
are even less likely to work overtime and receive shift allowances or bonuses.
Alternatively workers in the wholesale/retail sector are more likely to work
overtime (22 per cent) though only 5 per cent work over five hours overtime.
Those in wholesale/retail are less likely to get a shift allowance or bonus. 
Mean overtime earnings account for 3 per cent of weekly earnings among
workers in the JLC range while shift allowances and bonuses make up less
than 1 per cent (Table 6). Such payments are also very low in the
hotel/restaurant and wholesale/retail sectors. These extra earnings make up a
greater proportion of weekly earnings for workers on earnings above the JLC
range. Overall Tables 5 and 6 show the relative modest levels of overtime
earnings and shift allowances both absolutely and as a proportion of weekly
earnings particularly among workers covered by the JLC range. 
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The low proportion of workers receiving a shift allowance is somewhat
surprising as 31 per cent of workers in the JLC range and 24 per cent of those
above the range reported working shifts (Table 7). Altogether, using the
grossing weight, 25 per cent (322,881) of workers in the private sector report
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Table 5: Workers With Overtime, Bonuses and Shift Allowances 
Above the In the JLC Hotel/ Wholesale/ 
JLC Range Range Restaurant at Retail at the
the  JLC Range JLC Range
% % % %
Workers with any weekly 21 14 6 22
overtime hours and 
earnings
Worker paid any shift 9 3 5 3
allowance per week
Workers paid any bonus 8 3 2 3
earnings per week
* Mean overtime earnings are calculated as follows: weekly overtime earnings/(weekly
earnings –overtime earnings). Similarly for shift allowances and bonuses.
Table 6: Overtime, Bonuses and Shift Allowances as a Proportion of 
Weekly Earnings
Above the In the JLC Hotel/ Wholesale/ 
JLC Range Range Restaurant at Retail at the
the  JLC Range JLC Range
% % % %
Mean overtime 5 3 1 5
earnings as percentage 
of weekly earnings*
Mean shift allowances 2 0 0.7 0.6
as percentage of weekly 
earnings
Mean bonus as 6 0.3 0.5 0.3
percentage of weekly 
earnings
* Mean overtime earnings are calculated as follows: weekly overtime earnings/(weekly
earnings –overtime earnings). Similarly for shift allowances and bonuses.
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that they work shift work8 yet only 27 per cent of these appear to receive a
shift allowance. For workers covered by the JLC range the figures are indeed
stark with only 6 per cent who work shifts receiving a shift allowance
compared to 31 per cent of workers earning above the JLC range (Table 7). It
seems from these figures that the payment of a shift allowance is restricted to
a small minority of low pay workers including those covered by JLC rates.
How can we account for these results? It may be the case that employees
misinterpret overtime hours as a form of shift work or that the “shift work” is
only occasional and does not fit into the reference period of 4 to 6 weeks
guiding the employers’ responses. There is some evidence that employees
conflate overtime hours and shift work as the overall weekly mean for all
workers in the private sector who report working shift work is almost twice as
high, 1.6 overtime hours compared to 0.8 hours for those not working shifts.
Similarly for workers in the JLC range it is 0.8 overtime hours weekly
compared to 0.4. Yet even allowing for some confusion in employee responses
it is not likely to significantly change the above patterns. 
Table 7: Shift Work and Shift Allowances
Workers on Workers on Shift N
Shift Work Work ond Not
and Receiving Receiving an 
an Allowance Allowance
% %
Above the JLC range 31 69 100%
(270,166)
At the JLC range 6 94 100%
(52,715)
Total N 27 73 100
(87,230) (235,651) (322,881)
Where employers pay their workers a Sunday premium in the of form of
extra pay – ranging from time and a third to double pay depending on the
particular JLC ERO – it is bound to be reported by the employer either as
212 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
8 Respondents completing the employee survey are asked to tick the following question: “Are you
required to do shift work?” No further information is provided. The term “shift work” is generally
assumed to include any arrangement of daily working hours other than the standard daylight
hours of 7/8am to 5/6pm. Thus, we can only assume that respondents interpret shift work as
working hours outside of standard daytime hours in the range 7.00am to 6.00pm.
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overtime hours or as a shift allowance. In any case the purpose of the financial
details section of the NES employer survey is to capture all extra payments to
employees in an establishment above basic hourly and weekly pay. From the
data shown in Tables 3 to 7 only a minority of workers covered by JLCs seem
to work any overtime hours and actual weekly earnings from overtime, shift
allowances and bonuses appears quite negligible. Consequently, it is difficult
to see how such payments to workers covered by the JLC range could be
considered a significant cost to employers at least at the aggregate level.
Undoubtedly, there may be examples of employments where such costs are not
negligible but these are likely to be the exception rather than the rule.
Similarly for many workers covered by the JLC rates, overtime rates, Sunday
premiums, shift allowances and bonuses appear to be a chimera.
VI MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
Finally we examine the differences between workers covered by the JLC
range and those above the range on a number of individual characteristics,
workplace characteristics and working time. Multivariate analysis allows us
to identify the impact or intensity of a particular measure while controlling for
the likely effects of other measures. The dependent variable is “at and below
the JLC’. All the measures have been constructed to indicate the likelihood of
being covered by the JLC range. 
In Table 8 odds ratios are reported. Controlling for all measures, young
workers are three times more likely to be covered by a JLC rate. Workers with
no more than primary level education are twice as likely compared to those
with post-secondary levels education to fall within the JLC range. Manual and
routine service workers are six times more likely than managerial/professional
to be in the JLC range while non-nationals and part-time workers are twice as
likely. Similarly, low levels of employment service and being non-union are
also associated with being covered by JLC rates. Workers in small firms and
those employed in hotels/restaurants and whole/retail sectors are more likely
to be covered by JLCs. Workers who receive no shift allowance are twice as
likely to be in the JLC range even though such workers are twice as likely to
work shifts while workers who receive no bonuses are three times more likely
to be covered by a JLC. In the main these multivariate results tend to confirm
the findings from our earlier descriptive tables.
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Table 8: (Multivariate Analysis: Binary Logistic Regression. Odds Ratios
(Exp(B)) Reported, Standard Errors in Parentheses). Dependent Variable:
JLC Hourly Pay Rates: 1=At JLC Pay Range; 0=Above the JLC Pay Range
Individual Characteristics
Females 1.9***
Under 25 years 2.9***
25 to 35 years 1.0ns
36 to 45 years 0.9ns
Reference group: Over 46 years
None/primary education 2.1***
Secondary education 1.4***
Reference group: Higher education
Manual/service 6.1***
White collar/skilled/technical 2.2***
Reference group: Manage/professional
Non-nationals 2.1***
Part-time workers 2.1***
Workplace characteristics
Under 10 employees 1.6***
11 to 100 employees 1.5***
Reference group: greater 100 employees
Under 2 years’ service 1.8***
2 to 5 years’ service 1.4***
Reference group: Over 5 years
Non-union workers 1.6***
Transport/others 0.9ns
Finance/administration 1.2*
Hotels/restaurants 1.9***
Wholesale/retail 1.4***
Reference group: Industry
Working time
Work no overtime hours 1.7***
No shift allowance 2.0***
Work shifts 1.3***
No bonuses 3.1***
Chi-sq
6,296***
Nagelkerke pseudo R2 0.3
N 39,018
* P<0.05 ** P<0.01 ***P<0.001.
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VII CONCLUSION 
A significant rationale for the proposed reform of the JLCs focuses on
those EROs that are claimed to unduly add to the cost of labour regarding
overtime rates including premiums for Sunday working. The aim of this paper
was to assess the evidence for the extent of such extra payments as Sunday
premiums, shift allowance and overtime payments using the 2007 NES. Low
pay workers covered by JLC rates are more likely to be female, less educated,
part-time, under 25 years of age, non-nationals and work in manual or routine
service type work. At firm level workers in the JLC range are less likely to 
be in a trade union, have low levels of employment service and work
predominantly in the hotels/restaurant and whole/retail sectors. 
There is a statistically significant difference between those covered by the
JLC rates and workers above the JLC range regarding their work patterns.
On average workers in the JLC range work fewer hours per week, fewer over-
time hours and these overtime hours amount to a smaller proportion of their
hours worked per week. Among the workers covered by JLC rates men, non-
nationals, full-time workers, union members and workers in industry tend on
average to work longer hours. The relationship between specific employee
characteristics, working and payment patterns for workers covered by JLC
rates noted in Tables 3 to 7 is generally confirmed in our multivariate
analysis. When all measures are controlled for, young workers are three times
more likely to be covered by a JLC rate, manual/service workers six times
more likely and non-nationals and part-time workers twice as likely. Low
employment service and being non-union are also associated with being
covered by JLC rates. However, workers in the JLC range on average work a
small number of overtime hours and earn relatively little from overtime, shift
allowances and bonuses. Indeed overtime hours, overtime earnings, shift
allowances and bonuses earned are confined to a small proportion of workers
covered by the JLC range. Although up to 31 per cent of workers on JLC rates
report working shift work only a minority of these receive any paid shift
allowance. Low pay workers in particular are more likely to be in precarious
employment that is uncertain and unpredictable (Kallenberg, 2008). However
it seems for many in the private sector working time now extends beyond
standard daytime hours with few receiving any compensation for working
shifts.
Overall the evidence from the 2007 NES does not support the argument
that extra payments in the form of overtime payments that include Sunday
premiums, shift allowances or bonuses to workers covered by JLC EROs
represent a major cost to employers in general. Indeed such payments are
likely to have further declined in the aftermath of the financial and fiscal crisis
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of 2008. Thus, it might be argued that few workers covered by JLCs actually
benefit from the EROs covering Sunday work and overtime rates. 
Nevertheless, for the few who do benefit the removal of these rights to
basic working conditions likely represents a considerable diminution in their
conditions of employment. Yet not all employers are likely to undercut existing
arrangements and conditions at least not in the short term for existing
employees.9 This reflects the thrust of the efficiency wage arguments that
there are significant efficiency advantages motivating employers to pay wages
and offer working conditions above minimum wage rates and conditions. Even
so in a competitive market the removal of a floor on conditions of employment
provided by the JLCs may act to promote those firms with lower labour costs
and disadvantage firms who offer wages and working conditions above the
minimum creating a race to the bottom in low pay sectors of the economy.
REFERENCES
AKERLOF, G. and J. YELLEN, 1990. Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor Market. NJ:
Cambridge University Press.
BERG, J., J. DICKHAUT and K. MCCABE, 1995. “Trust, Reciprocity, and Social
History”, Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 10, pp. 122-142.
BHASKAR, V. and T. TO, 1999. “Minimum Wages for Ronald McDonals Monopsonies:
A Theory of Monopsonistic Competition”, The Economic Journal, Vol. 109, 
pp. 190-203.
BÖCKERMAN, P. and R. USITALO, 2009. “Minimum Wages and Youth Employment:
Evidence from the Finnish Retail Trade Sector”, British Journal of Industrial
Relations, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 388-405.
CARD, D. and A. KRUEGER, 1995. Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of the
Minimum Wage, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
CLEMENT, B., 1993. “Farewell to the Workers’ Friend: Barrie Clement Mourns the
Untimely Passing of Britain’s Wages Councils”, The Independent, 26 August.
Available at [http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/farewell-to-the-workers-
friend-barrie-clement-mourns-the-untimely-passing-of-britains-wages-councils-
1463491.html]
D’ART, D. and T. TURNER, 2006. “New Working Arrangements: Changing the Nature
of the Employment Relationship?” International Journal of Human Resource
Management Journal, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 523-538.
DEAKIN, S. and F. GREEN, 2009. “One Hundred Years of Minimum Wage
Legislation”, British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 205-213.
DICKENS, L., S. MACHIN and A. MANNING, 1999. “The Effects of Minimum Wages
on Employment: Theory and Evidence from Britain”, Journal of Labor Economics,
Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 1-22.
216 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
9 For example, in the absence of EROs since the legal case on JLCs, employers and unions in the
contract cleaning industry have negotiated an agreement and have sought to make it legally
binding as a Registered Employment Agreement.
03 Turner article_ESRI Vol 43-4  19/06/2013  09:31  Page 216
DJEI, 2011a. Submission to the Review of the Framework of Employment Regulation
Orders and Registered Employment Agreements, Dublin: Department of Jobs,
Enterprise and Innovation, February.
DJEI, 2011b. Bruton Announces Reforms to JLC/REA Systems, Dublin: Department of
Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation, July.
DUFFY, K. and F. WALSH, 2011. Report of Independent Review of Employment
Regulation Orders and Registered Employment Agreement Wage Setting
Mechanisms, Dublin: Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation.
EDWARDS, P. K., 1986. Conflict at Work: A Materialist Analysis of Workplace
Relations, London: Blackwell.
EHRENBERG, R. and R. SMITH, 1994. Modern Labor Economics: Theory and Public
Policy (5th ed.), New York: Harper Collins College Publishers. 
FANG, T. and M. GUNDERSON, 2009. “Minimum Wage Impacts on Older Workers:
Longitudinal Estimates from Canada”, British Journal of Industrial Relations,
Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 371-387.
FEHR, E., GÄCHTER, S. and G. KIRCHSTEIGER, 1997. “Reciprocity as a Contract
Enforcement Device”, Econometrica, Vol. 65, No. 4, pp. 833-860.
FOX, A., 1974. Man Mismanagement, London: Hutchinson.
FUNK, L. and H. LESCH, 2005. Minimum Wages in Europe, European Industrial
Relations Observatory Online. Available at [http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/
2005/07/study/tn0507101s.htm].
GREGORY, M. and D. ROMER (eds.), 1991. New Keynesian Economics, 2 vols,
Cambridge: MIT Press.
GRIMSHAW, D. and M. GREEN, 2006. “Adjusting to the National Minimum Wage:
Constraints and Incentives to Change in Six Low-Paying Sectors”, Industrial
Relations Journal, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 22-47.
HIBBS, D. and H. LOCKING, 2000. “Wage Dispersion and Productive Efficiency:
Evidence for Sweden”, Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 755-782.
HIGGINS, C., 2011a. “Unions – and Some Employers – Defend Sectoral Wage System”,
Industrial Relations News, 9.
HIGGINS, C., 2011b. “Employers Back Reformed REAs, But Hit at New Government’s
Policy”, Industrial Relations News, 10.
KALLENBERG, A., 2008. “Precarious Work, Secure Workers: Employment Relations
in Transition”, American Sociological Review, Vol.74 (February), pp. 1-22.
KAUFMAN, B., 2009. Promoting Labour Market Efficiency and Fairness through a
Legal Minimum Wage: The Webbs and the Social Cost of Labour, British Journal
of Industrial Relations, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 306-326.
KEENEY, M. and M. LAWLESS, 2010. Wage Setting and Wage Flexibility in Ireland:
Results from a Firm-Level Survey, European Central Bank Working Paper No.
1181. 
KIM, T. and L. J. TAYLOR, 1995. “The Employment Effect in Retail Trade of
California’s 1988 Minimum Wage Increase”, Journal of Business and Economic
Statistics, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 175-182.
LEE, D., 1999. “Wage Inequality in the United States During the 1980s: Rising
Dispersion or Falling Minimum Wage?”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.
114, No. 3, pp. 977-1023.
WAGE SETTING MECHANISMS FOR VULNERABLE WORKERS IN IRELAND 217
03 Turner article_ESRI Vol 43-4  19/06/2013  09:31  Page 217
LOW PAY COMMISSION (LPC), 1998. The National Minimum Wage: First Report of
the Low Pay Commission, Cmnd 3976, London: HMSO.
LOW PAY COMMISSION (LPC), 2003. The National Minimum Wage: Building on
Success, Fourth Report of the Low Pay Commission, Cmnd 5768, London: HMSO.
McCONNELL, C., S. BRUE and S. FLYNN, 2008. Economic. 18th Edition, McGraw-
Hill.
MCLAUGHLIN, C., 2009. “The Productivity-Enhancing Impacts of the Minimum
Wage: Lessons from Denmark and New Zealand”, British Journal of Industrial
Relations, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 327-348. 
METCALF, D., 2008. “Why has the British National Minimum Wage had Little or No
Impact on Employment?”, Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 50, pp. 489-512.
MOENE, K. and M. WALLERSTEIN, 2006. “Social Democracy as a Development
Strategy” in P. Bardhan, S. Bowles and M. Wallerstein (eds.), Globalization and
Egalitarian Redistribution, NJ: Princeton University Press.
NEUMARK, D., W. WASCHER, 2008. Minimum Wages, Cambridge, Massachusetts:
The MIT Press.
O’NEILL, D., B. NOLAN and J. WILLIAMS, 2006. “Evaluating the Introduction of a
National Minimum Wage: Evidence from a New Survey of Firms in Ireland”,
Labour, Vol. 20, No.1, pp. 63-90.
O’SULLIVAN, M. and T. ROYLE, 2009. “Fast Food Employers and Minimum Wage
Regulation in Ireland”, Proceedings of the British Universities Industrial Relations
Association Annual Conference, July 2-4, Cardiff.
O’SULLIVAN, M. and J. WALLACE, 2011. “Minimum Labour Standards in a Social
Partnership System – The Persistence of the Irish Variant of Wages Councils”,
Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 18-35.
SCHULTEN, T., 2010. “Minimum Wages Under the Conditions of the Global Economic
Crisis” in J. Heyes and L. Rychly (eds.), Labour Administration and the Economic
Crisis. Challenges, Responses and Opportunities, Geneva: International Labour
Organisation.
SWEENEY, P. and F. O’BRIEN, 2011. “Is the State’s Wage-Setting System Necessary?”,
The Irish Times, June 18.
STOREY, J., 1980. The Challenge to Management Control, London: Kogan Page.
THOMPSON, P., 2004. “Labor Process Theory, Work and the Employment Relation” in
B. Kaufman (ed.), Theoretical Perspectives on Work and the Employment
Relationship, Industrial Relations Research Association Series: University of
Illinois.
WALL, M., 2011a. “IBEC Accuses Government of Prejudicing Wage-Rules Review”, The
Irish Times, March 15. 
WALL, M., 2011b. “Changes to Proposal for Wages, Says Bruton”, The Irish Times,
June 30. 
WEBB, S. and B. WEBB, 1909. The Public Organisation of the Labour Market: Being
Part Two of the Minority Report of the Poor Law Commission, London: Longmans,
Green and Co.
WILLIAMSON, O., M. WACHTER and J. HARRIS, 1975. “Understanding the
Employment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange”, The Bell Journal
of Economics, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 250-278.  
218 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
03 Turner article_ESRI Vol 43-4  19/06/2013  09:31  Page 218
APPENDIX
Mean Hours, Overtime and Shift Allowances Above and Below JLC Hourly
Earnings for Four Sectors (Data Weighted)
All Sectors Manu- Wholesale/ Hotels/ Business
(Table 3 facturing Retail Restaurants Services
in Paper)
Hours JLC range 29.87 33 29 27 22
worked Above JLC range 35.86 39 34 32 35
p/wk
Overtime JLC range 0.5 0.36 0.71 0.16 0.06
hours p/wk Above JLC range 1.1 2.0 0.51 0.24 0.49
Overtime JLC range 1.6% 0.7% 1.7% 0.5% 0.13%
hours as % Above JLC range 2.6% 4.4% 2.0% 0.7% 1.1%
of hours 
p/wk
Overtime JLC range €6.20 €3.9 €5.9 €1.96 €0.75
earnings Above JLC range €25.70 €49.1 €13.8 €4.2 €11.8
p/wk 
Shift JLC range €0.70 €0 €0.2 €1.6 €0.22
allowance Above JLC range €10.50 €33.4 €1.6 €2.3 €3.7
p/wk
Bonus JLC range €0.90 €0.2 €0.5 €0.06 €0
earned Above JLC range €21.3 €20 €21 €4.2 €27.4
p/wk
N JLC range 4,466 115 1,303 605 145
Above JLC range 39,643 9,053 7,505 1,889 7,180
Notes: Manufacturing sector JLC rate: €8.61 to €8.69 (range used in table: €8.59 to
€8.8); Wholesale/retail sector JLC range: €8.45 to €9.59; Hotels and restaurants sector
JLC range: €8.36 to €9.44; Business services sector JLC rate: €9.05 (range used in
table: €9.0 to €9.1).
We have omitted the Public Administration and Defence sector as it is not the
appropriate sector for security workers who are predominantly private sector based.
While there is some variation across the four sectors it is minimal and does not change
our conclusion that the number of overtime hours per week is very low for workers in
each JLC range at under 1 hour per week. Similarly, weekly overtime earnings ranges
from €0.75 to €5.90 and shift allowances and bonuses are miniscule for workers in the
JLC range in these sectors. In addition the number of respondents in the
manufacturing and business services is extremely low and could not be considered
sufficiently robust or reliable.
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